Non-Hierarchical Signalling: Two-Stage Financing Game

Anton Miglo, Nikolay Zenkevich

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    The literature analyzing games where some players have private information about their types is usually based on the duality of good and bad types (GB approach), where good type denotes the type with better quality. In contrast, this paper analyzes a signalling game without types hierarchy. Different types have the same average qualities but different profiles of quality over time which are their private information. We apply this idea to analyze a financing-investment game where firms' insiders have private information about the firm's profit profile over time. If transporting cash between period is costless equilibrium is pooling with up-front equity financing. Otherwise equilibrium is either pooling with debt when the economy is stagnating, or separating when the economy is growing (some firms issue debt and some firms issue shares). This provides new theoretical results that cannot be explained by the standard GB models and which are consistent with some financial market phenomena.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)257-273
    Number of pages17
    JournalInternational Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory and Algebra
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished (VoR) - 2006


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