Ownership Structure of Oil Revenues, Political Institutions and Financial Markets in Oil-Producing Countries

Jabir Ibrahim Mohammed*, Vera Ogeh Fiador, Amin Karimu, Joshua Yindenaba Abor

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (SciVal)

    Abstract

    This study examines the impact of the ownership structure of oil revenues on financial markets and institutions by considering the role of political institutions. We use the fixed effects model and data from 82 oil-producing countries to uncovered very interesting findings. First, the government?s share of oil revenues investment undermines the quality of financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak and enhances their quality when political institutions is strong. Second, the private share of oil revenue investment is negative on the depth of and access to financial institutions when the quality of political institutions is weak and their quality is stabilized when political institutions is strong. Finally, in the subsample of developing countries, similar threshold effects are observed for the depth of and access to financial markets. We conclude that oil-producing countries need solid political institutions to fully benefit from oil wealth to boost financial development.
    Original languageEnglish
    Article number100760
    JournalJournal of Multinational Financial Management
    Volume66
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished (VoR) - 29 Jul 2022

    Keywords

    • Financial institutions and markets
    • Government oil revenues
    • International oil companies
    • Ownership structure
    • Political institutions
    • Private oil revenues

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